# Half Hour Hegel: The Complete Phenomenology of Spirit (Introduction, sec. 84-86)

**Channel:** Gregory B. Sadler - That Philosophy Guy
**Source:** https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p9mtOfBhcaY
**Transcript page:** https://www.withtranscript.ai/video/p9mtOfBhcaY

## Chapters

- 0:15 — Consciousness Provides Its Own Criterion
- 6:27 — Flipping Notion and Object Within Consciousness
- 14:33 — Consciousness as Observer and Testing the Criterion
- 24:44 — Experience and the Emergence of Two Objects

## Transcript

**[0:15]:** But the dissociation or the semblance of dissociation and presupposition is overcome by the nature of the object we are investigating. Consciousness provides its own criterion from within itself so that the investigation becomes a comparison of consciousness with itself. For the distinction made above falls within it. In consciousness, one thing exists for another. That is consciousness regularly contains the determinatess of the moment of knowledge. At the same time, this other is to consciousness not merely for it but is also outside of the relationship or exists in itself. The moment of truth. Thus in what consciousness affirms from within itself as being in itself or the true we have the standard by which cons which consciousness itself sets up by which to measure what it knows. If we designate knowledge as the notion but the essence or the true as what exists or the object then the examination consists in seeing whether the notion corresponds to the object.

**[1:37]:** But if we call the essence or in itself of the object the notion and on the other hand understand by the object the notion itself as object that is as it exists for another then the examination consists in seeing whether the object corresponds to its notion. It is evident of course that the two procedures are actually the same. But the essential point to bear in mind throughout our whole investigation is that these two moments notion and object being for another being for itself both fall within that knowledge which we are investigating. Consequently, we do not need to import criteria or to make use of our own bright ideas and thoughts during the course of the inquiry. It is precisely when we leave these aside that we succeed in contemplating the matter in hand as it is in and for itself.

**[2:36]:** Hegel begins section 84 by telling us that what we're really dealing with here is not actually the sort of conundrum that we thought that we had with consciousness and its own criterion for its knowledge on one side and the object the in itself the truth of what it is that we're trying to seek out on the other. So that we have subject and object or subject and world or even subject and other person. He says that what we've got here is a semblance a shine an appearance of dissociation tren splitting. Well that would be more spaltum slicing and presupposition for something that we're setting out beforehand. there. These are only in appearance. Why? Because there's something that's going on that we haven't taken stock of yet in all of what we've been doing. And it's so obvious once it's pointed out that you're likely to say, "Oh, how did I not notice that?"

**[3:47]:** It's also a move which is going to really stress the idealism that Hegel is identified with. So let's go back to what we had. We have an object of of knowing and we call this the in itself, the being in itself. Uh Hegel says that truth in some sense lies on the side of the object. And how does consciousness relate itself to it? through through knowing. And so knowing is in a certain sense a penetration into the object from something that is not the object, something that differentiates itself from it. And we were saying, well, how do we know that the knowledge is actually knowledge? How do we know the truth of the knowledge? And that entailed moving from the in itself of knowledge to the realization that knowledge itself is something for consciousness. That knowledge can also become a object. And when we're trying to talk about the in itself of knowledge, we're already treating it like an object at the same time that we're using it as part of our subjectivity.

**[5:00]:** So Hegel says the criterion lies within consciousness. No, he's not saying that it lies within every single one of us as a completely infallible, you know, totally reliable guide. He's not appealing to something like intuition or feeling. This is going to be something that has to be developed and assured. But there is something within us. He he's saying that does give us some standard that we can use and we come to a conflict. We have a standard here and a standard here. How do we get out of this? How do we show that this is actually not the case? He goes on and he says, so consciousness provides its own criterion from within itself. The investigation becomes a comparison of consciousness with itself. Consciousness uses that that very criterion to compare itself with itself. Which means that when we think about what consciousness is, we need to think about consciousness as encompassing all of this knowing and also encompassing this comparison.

**[6:05]:** And now notice what we're doing. I'm doing this graphically, but you have to do this through thought. That's what Hegel's after here. Consciousness encompasses more than we originally thought it did. That's the key point here. Consciousness encompasses more than we i.e. consciousness thought it did.

**[6:27]:** Consciousness is becoming conscious of the fact that consciousness is more than it took itself to be. See what's going on there? So he goes on and he says in consciousness one thing exists for another. That is consciousness contains the determiness of the moment of knowledge. That's what what's going on here. Right? At the same time, this other is to consciousness not merely for it, but is also outside of this relationship or exists in itself. So far so good. So we've got consciousness which is bigger than it realized it was. And you know, now that it's paying closer attention to itself by doing phenomenological investigation, it realizes that it's really encompassing quite a lot. But there's still this other lying outside of it in itself, the moment of truth. So he says, "Thus in what consciousness affirms from within being as being in itself for the true, we have the standard which consciousness sets up by which to measure what it knows."

**[7:32]:** What does that mean? Here's what it means.

**[7:41]:** This is actually the same thing as this. The criterion that is in consciousness of its knowing for knowledge of what is not consciousness is this thing over here that seems to be in itself. Now, doesn't that promote a sort of skepticism? We don't know what's over here. So, now we've just imported otherness and alterity and and a blank knowing, nothing into the middle of consciousness. Or did

**[8:19]:** we? Haven't we been carrying out this entire procedure in terms of consciousness through consciousness? Doesn't the in itself exist as in itself? Not only for consciousness but in the realm of consciousness. So he says if we designate uh knowledge as the notion but the essence or the true as what exists or the object um then the examination consists in seeing whether the notion corresponds to the object. So we can go from this to this and see if they correspond. You know here's the notion here's the object. But you know what? Because this is all within consciousness, we can also flip it around. We can put the notion on this side and we can put the object on this side. We can use this as the measure. He says if we call the essence or in itself of the object the notion on the on the other hand understand by the object the notion itself is object as it exists for an other for consciousness for us.

**[9:23]:** Then the examination consists in seeing whether the object corresponds to its notion. So does the notion correspond to its object? Does the object correspond to its notion? Is there a disharmony between the two of them? Generally there's going to be some some disjunction between them until the entire circuit of phenomenal consciousness has been brought into one expansive systematic fully cognizant whole. So he says it's evident these two procedures are the same. The essential point to bear in mind throughout the whole investigation is that these two moments notion and object being for another and being for being in itself both fall within that knowledge which we are investigating. So whether we want to call this you know subject and this object or notion and object or knowledge and truth or we want to flip them around. It's all within the domain of consciousness. Now that doesn't mean that it's within the domain of any one individual consciousness.

**[10:30]:** But we're finding out that this problem of skepticism about whether we can truly understand, know, appropriate things turns out to be a a boogeyman. Says, so we don't need to import criteria. We've already got the criteria. He says, we don't need to make use of our own bright ideas and thoughts during the course of the inquiry. It's precisely when we leave these aside that we succeed in contemplating the matter of hand as it is. And now we're fusing things together in and for itself. Now, what does that mean? That means that if we're doing phenomenology, we need to be paying attention to what's over here and allowing that to actually be the criterion for the investigation as we're carrying it out as consciousness. There's a process of going back and forth between these two. And we don't need to bring in some things from the outside.

**[11:26]:** We don't need a presupposition because we already have something that is for our gazettes. We already have something that is out there for us. And we assume that it's out there for us as something other, something opposed, something that we need to get to know, not realizing that it's already out there for us in our consciousness, in the consciousness that's been developed through the historical process.

**[11:57]:** But not only is a contribution by us superfluous since notion and object, the criterion and what is to be tested are present in consciousness itself, but we are also spared the trouble of comparing the two and really testing them. So that since what consciousness examines is its own self, all that is left for us to do is simply look on. Her consciousness is on the one hand consciousness of the object and on the other consciousness of itself. Consciousness of what for it is the true and consciousness of its knowledge of the truth. Since both are for the same consciousness, this consciousness is itself their comparison. It is for the same consciousness to know whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object or not. The object it is true seems only to be for consciousness in the way that consciousness knows it. It seems that consciousness cannot as it were get behind the object as it exists for consciousness so as to examine what the object is in itself and hence too cannot test its own knowledge by that standard.

**[13:02]:** But the distinction between the in itself and knowledge is already present in the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all. Something is for it the in itself and knowledge or the being of the object for consciousness is for it another moment. Upon this distinction which is present as a fact, the examination rests. If the comparison is present, if the comparison shows that these two moments do not correspond to one another, it would seem that consciousness must alter its knowledge to make it conform to the object. But in fact, in the alteration of the knowledge, the object itself alters for it too. For the knowledge that was present was essentially a knowledge of the object. As the knowledge changes, so too does the object, for it essentially belonged to this knowledge. Hence, it comes to pass for consciousness that what it previously took to be the in itself is not an in itself or that it was only an in itself for consciousness.

**[14:03]:** Since consciousness thus finds that its knowledge does not correspond to its object, the object itself does not stand the test. In other words, the criterion for testing is altered when that for which it was to have been the criterion fails to pass the test. And the testing is not only a testing of what we know, but also a testing of the criterion of what knowing is.

**[14:33]:** Hegel is now able to bring together these different movements and themes so that we can understand what it is that we're doing in phenomenology in a phenomenology of spirit of consciousness as it develops through time. And he's going to use consciousness in a sort of double way here. one in which it is essentially passive in how it seems but it its truest activity is is actually contemplative and he talks about um just watching just looking on Zuzan just just observing um what is consciousness observing so we need to follow this out there's a lot of twists and turns in this he says we don't need to make a contribution we can be just observers. It would be superolous. Why? Because notion and object, criterion, and what are to be tested are present in consciousness itself. But we're also spared the trouble of testing them. Now, what does that mean that we're spared the trouble of testing them?

**[15:46]:** Well, does that mean that consciousness itself is purely passive? Just sits back and accepts the results? In a sense, the consciousness of the present does that with what consciousness has already carried out in the past. And much of what we're doing in the phenomenology is reappropriating what has gone on through the activity, through the thinking, through the struggle of the past. That has to do with correspondence between notion and object criterion and what is assessed. So he says, what consciousness examines is really its own self. All that's left to do is simply look on, just watch, just observe. For consciousness is on the one hand consciousness of the object. And on the other hand, consciousness is consciousness of self. And it goes without saying that in being consciousness of both object and consciousness of self, since consciousness is of the object, it is also of the relationship between itself and the object.

**[16:49]:** And this could be, you know, spelled out in in many more complex ways and and will once we get to concrete determinatitness and start thinking about distinctive stages in the development of of spirit. But this suffices for right now. So we have consciousness the object and we know that knowledge is something that really matters here. So he says consciousness is on the one hand consciousness of the object and on the other consciousness of itself. consciousness of for what what for it is the true and consciousness of its knowledge of the truth. So we have knowledge and truth the in itself the process of for another for consciousness and he says um since both are for the same consciousness this consciousness itself is their comparison. Why can consciousness just sort of look on? because all of this is actually taking place within the extent of consciousness and it doesn't have to carry out an active process of comparing these because they're already comparing themselves against each other or they've already done so.

**[17:59]:** So he says this consciousness is itself their comparison. It is for the same consciousness to know whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object or not. What is the connection between these two? Consciousness grasps that. Now, he he's presenting it here as if it takes place in a very immediate way. And if that were so simple, then we just have to snap our fingers and be already at page, you know, whatever in the very last section of absolute knowing. Obviously, it's going to take a bit more than that, but this is the outline of what's going on. So he says the object it's true seems to be for consciousness in the way that consciousness knows it. So there's the object as it is for us in knowledge and then there's the in itself and that's why I put the verses here. All right.

**[18:54]:** But as we saw this in itself also falls within consciousness. It is not truly in itself. It seems that way. He says it seems that consciousness cannot as it were get behind the object as it exists for consciousness and so as to examine what the object is in itself and though so it cannot test its own knowledge by that standard. And here we might want to like think about examples of this. Um you know we can talk about the fact that I I can't truly know what this piece of chalk is in and of itself. there's always something within it that's that's resisting and eluding my knowledge of it. Even if I learn all the chemistry of it, that's fine. I don't have in mind that sort of thing. What I'm thinking of is more along the lines of how do you get to know a person?

**[19:51]:** Consciousness, myself. Object you. Knowledge I know you. I don't just mean acquaintance. I mean that if I get to know you say in the form of a friendship over time there's things that I come to know a whole history uh you know I I can coalesce all these things into a person into an image that I have of you. Is it possible for me to be mistaken? Sure. Do I have to revise what it is that I I think I'm I'm encountering in that object? Yeah. Might you have sides to you that I totally, you know, have no clue about that I don't suspect exist? Possible. Could that be the case for ourselves? Can we be an object for oursel in that way? See, there we start to get into things that are a little bit more sticky than my relation to a piece of chalk, don't we?

**[20:54]:** But that's the sort of thing that he's talking about. Now think about my relationship to great historical ideas. What is freedom? Do I fully understand the notion of freedom? Treating that that object as as a notion or is my knowledge of it to some degree inadequate. Is there sides to it that I can't actually fully know? Is there something that always elilludes me about it? Perhaps. But where does that eluding fall in? Who can worry about that? Consciousness. Consciousness encompasses the very skeptical doubts about whether it knows the in itself. So he says um the distinction between the in itself and knowledge is already present in the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all. relationality being able to be connected to something outside of yourself already presupposes this dialectic between object and knowledge within consciousness. So he says um upon this distinction which is present as a fact the examination rests.

**[22:07]:** If the comparison shows that these two moments don't correspond to one another, if my knowledge doesn't correspond to the object as I come to know it, then I got to fix my knowledge, right? I've got to adjust what's going on here. Now, notice too that there's a there's a a converse to this that's very important. He says, um, in fact, the alteration of in the alteration of the knowledge, the object alters as well. When we change how we relate to other things, we actually change our consciousness of those other things in the process. and oftentimes is revealed to us that they are different than we thought. We get to know a friend better and we find out that they're not that much of a friend at all and we get to know somebody else who's not a friend and we realize they're they're a wonderful person.

**[23:02]:** Our knowledge reveals to us that the object was not quite what we took it for to begin with. That's how we acquire more and and more adequate knowledge. So he says um then as the knowledge changes so does the object for it essentially belong to this this knowledge. Hence it comes to pass for consciousness that what it previously took to be the in itself is not an in itself. It's an in itself for consciousness. It is not a true in itself. Since consciousness thus finds its knowledge does not correspond to its object. What knowledge? the knowledge of what it is to be in itself. The object itself does not stand to the test. In other words, the criterion for testing is altered when that which was to what that for which it was to have been the criterion fails to pass the test. When what's being assessed fails, the criterion itself gets called into question.

**[24:05]:** He says the testing is not only a testing of what we know but also a testing of the criterion itself. How do we bring all these together? We've got a lot of things spilled out on this board. So what's really going on here is all this process of what consciousness is realizing going on within its own purview. And this has been going on for a long time. long enough for consciousness to have arrived at the point where it can be fully conscious of all that's passed. That's what Hegel's after

**[24:44]:** here. In as much as the new true object issues from it, this dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge and its object is precisely what is called experience. In this connection, there is a moment in the process just mentioned which must be brought out more clearly for through it a new light will be thrown on the exposition which follows. Consciousness knows something. This object is the essence or the in itself. But it is also for consciousness the in itself. This is where the ambiguity of this truth enters. We see that consciousness now has two objects. One is the first in itself. The second is the being for consciousness of this in itself. The latter appears at first sight to be merely the reflection of consciousness into itself. That is what consciousness has in mind is not an object but only its knowledge of that first object.

**[25:38]:** But as was shown previously, the first object in being known is altered for consciousness. It ceases to be the in itself and becomes something that is the in itself only for consciousness. And this then is the true the being for consciousness of this in itself or in other words this is the essence or the object of consciousness. This new object contains the nothingness of the first. It is what is it is what experience has made of

**[26:11]:** it. Here in section 86, Hegel reintroduces a very important term that we want to take some cognizance of. And I'm going to dwell a little bit. I don't do this very often, but I'm going to dwell a little bit on on the the lexicality of it, the very, you know, meaning of of of the term as we unpack it in its native German. So, you know, thin means to to travel along some sort of path or trajectory. And in a certain way, you know, it also means to to take a ride. And that's what that's what's going on in the phenomenology. We're we're studying experiences. And we often think of experience as just something that impinges upon us. We think about our life experiences or the experiential versus the cognitive. And we make these sort of distinctions. And the way that Hegel's using the term that that doesn't really work.

**[27:07]:** For one thing, we're talking about the experience of consciousness. I think a lot of people fall into the trap u this is a little bit of a soap box here, but it's it's very useful for understanding Hegel or for understanding philosophy in general. A lot of people fall in the trap of talking about their their what's experiential versus what's abstract or cognitive or discursive or what have you. And you know, we can make that distinction there. There is something there to say, well, you haven't experienced it yourself, so therefore you don't know about it. But you know what sets us apart as human beings from the other animals is the very fact that we're able to share experiences. And I don't mean just share in the sense of you and I are on the same river raft adventure together. What I mean is that I can write about it and you can read about it or I can shoot a video about it and talk to you about it and you can imagine it and you can imagine it

**[28:02]:** if I have you know wonderful powers of expression which I don't have as a novelist you can imagine it in detail you can you can bring to it your own experiences and fill it out so that's one aspect the other thing is thinking itself is an action contemplation produces experience It's not as if we have a world of experience over here and then we have what we do in philosophy over here. Philosophy itself involves an experience. But an experience is something that should in fact inspire at least to some degree in us at some times wonder and it should provoke a curiosity perhaps a sense of the discordance of of things. Those are all experiences according to Hegel. So what we're talking about here is this this progression of experiences and he says um if we think about what's going on this dialectical movement that consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge and its object.

**[29:09]:** This is what consciousness is doing. Consciousness as we just said a little bit earlier consciousness is doing more than it's conscious of doing. And we we want to explore that thematically. This entire dialectic is what we call experience. In this connection, he says there's a moment in the process just mentioned which must be brought out more clearly. So that's what this section is about. This this particular moment through it a new light will be shed on the exposition that follows. So we want to pay attention here, right? Consciousness knows something. The object is the essence or the in itself. But we've already gone over this, right? So we have consciousness and consciousness through knowledge knows the object or the in itself. So far so good and it's also for consciousness the in itself. So we saw the consciousness encompasses all of this

**[30:07]:** right? He says this is where the ambiguity of this truth enters. The object becomes double. Is it the same object or is it two different objects? That's what's going on here that he wants to call our attention to. And he's going to make some real use of that in the next paragraph. But first, we want to dwell on this. Why do we have two objects here? How how does that make sense? Where did where did this extra object come from? Well, we started out with the object as the in itself or the essence. And then we realized that since it was encompassed, it was in itself for consciousness. And this is part of what got us over our worries about, you know, what about those in itself that I can't access out there. It's like well consciousness actually you know and even posing that problem is is making that a problem for consciousness.

**[31:06]:** It's bringing it within consciousness's ambit or or purview. But this isn't the same as this. These are two distinct moments within consciousness and we've moved from this to this. This as he says reveals the nullity of the original object. And going back to just the previous passages when we talked about this this correspondence between knowledge and object and realizing that that maybe knowledge and object don't map on to each other that well or notion and object don't map on to each other that well. When we change the one side, we also change the other side. So if we're losing something here, we're also losing something over here. And we're introducing negativity once again into consciousness in a in a very uh straightforward way. He says consciousness now has two objects. The first it one is the first in itself. The second is the being for consciousness of this in itself.

**[32:08]:** The latter appears at first sight to be merely the reflection of consciousness into itself. what consciousness has in mind is not an object but only knowledge, right? Uh the first object. Maybe that's all this this really is. But it's not. He says, here we go. Um as is shown previously, the first object in being known is being changed for consciousness. It ceases to be the in itself and becomes something that is the in itself only for consciousness. And this then is the truth. This is the truth that we're seeking. The being for a consciousness of this in itself. Or in other words, this is the essence or the object of consciousness. The new object contains the nothingness of the first. It is what

**[33:11]:** experience has made of it. So what does experience mean for Hegel? Part of what it means is realizing that what we thought we knew as we got to know it better, as we started to take stock of our own relation to it and our own contribution to creating that that object, as we brought it into the the purview of consciousness explicitly, we experience it differently. And part of experience includes the discordance between one experience and the other. We can talk of experience in the terms of like one single experience. Little punctual points. But we can also talk about experience as something broader. We're able to have experiences of not having experienced of having experienced of remembering an experience of misremembering an experience. All of these are possible. So this is what he means by experience. Getting to know the truth of what it is that we've engaged oursself with by realizing that we ourselves are involved in the process of constituting what it is that we're thinking to be true.

**[34:33]:** We're building truth. We're uncovering truth. We're engaged in truth in the very process. Truth is not something totally outside of us.
