Transcript

So today we're going to continue our our discussion of equity and efficiency. We started last time talking about the equity efficiency trade-off. Well, first we talked about why we think redistribution might be necessary in the striking facts on inequality and poverty in the US. Then we talked about the trade-off, the equity efficiency trade-off and the fact that when you try to deal with a problem like redistribution through taxation or transfers, you're going to have a leaky bucket. That there's going to be inefficiencies associated with both taxing individuals to raise the money and transferring individuals to spend the money are both going to cause deadweight loss.

So what I wanted you today is take that abstract framework from last time, put it in some real terms by talking first about how taxation works in the US and the kind of issues we face in taxing people and then turning to redistrib- redistribution programs and concluding with a very positive story of sort of what I call a patch to the leaky bucket and how we can redistribute in a very efficient way. So let's start by talking about taxation in the US. And when I talk about taxation, I want to talk about two topics primarily. The first topic is who bears taxes. Who bears taxes? Now, this is a topic that we call in public finance, the field I specialize in, the topic of tax incidence.

Now you might think this is sort of a silly question. I mean, if you pay tax, you bear the tax. Why is this an interesting question? And the answer is it's an interesting question cuz it's not true that the person that bears the tax pays the tax. But in fact, when you impose taxes, they have complicated effects on multiple parties because of the operation of the market. Okay? So as a result, the party that actually sends the check to the government may not actually bear all that tax. And so that's sort of the interesting insight we'll start with today. So to think about that, let's go to figure 22-1.

And let's think about a tax the market for gasoline. Okay, you've got demand and supply. You've got an initial 100 billion gallons of gas being sold at a price of 1.50. Those were the days, back when gas was 1.50. Okay? Now, imagine the government comes in and says, "We're going to levy a 50 cent tax per gallon on the suppliers of gasoline." So the gas stations or the gas companies or whatever, for every gallon they sell, they will send us 50 cents. You'll literally cut a check to the government 50 cents for every gallon you sell. What does that do? And you might stop there and say, "Okay, well, then the incidence of that tax is that tax is borne by producers.

That's great. I don't have to worry about it. I'm buying gas. It's those guys selling gas who have to bear it." But you'd be wrong. And the reason you'd be wrong is shown in the right-hand side diagram, which is to think through the market effect of such intervention. What does the intervention do? Well, it has no effect on the demand for gas. Okay? The the fundamental demand curve, your underlying utility of the of the marginal gallon of gas hasn't changed. But it has changed the supply curve. Because essentially we've introduced a new marginal cost. The marginal cost of gas has gone up by 50 cents a gallon.

Every gallon of gas you produce and sell now bears an extra 50 cent cost. So that's a shift upward of the supply curve. Now the supply curve is the marginal cost curve. So if I increase the marginal cost cost of every gallon by 50 cents, that's literally just a parallel shift upwards in the supply curve. Supply curve shifts from S1 to S2. That's your supply curve. Well, at that new supply curve, you cannot continue to charge the old price. If you continue to charge the old price of a dollar 50, people would still want to buy 100 billion gallons of gas, but companies would only want to sell 80 billion gallons.

Why? Because the marginal cost has gone up. And we have an upward sloping supply curve, so at a higher marginal cost, they're going to want to sell fewer gallons. Okay? So you have a disequilibrium. What happens is that the gas company adjusts by sliding up the supply curve to the new equilibrium point D, where they sell 90 billion gallons at a new price of a dollar 80. Okay? This is all just standard supply demand stuff. We've seen that before. What's interesting here is to note that what this means is that part of the tax is borne by consumers. Okay? Part of the tax borne by consumers. What do I mean by that?

What I mean is consumers used to pay a dollar 50 a gallon and now they pay a dollar 80 a gallon. So the tax has increased what they pay by 30 cents a gallon. Now they're not sending that check to the government, but it's the same thing. It's the same effect. The point is this tax has increased the amount the consumers pay for gas by 30 cents a gallon. So the incidence on consumers is 30 cents. The incidence on producers is d- a little more complicated. They now get a dollar 80 per gallon, right? That's great. But for every gallon they sell, they have to send a 50 cent check to the government. So their net price per gallon is a dollar 30.

So we can see that by taking the new price at point D and subtracting off the 50 cent tax they have to pay. Okay? Which which now which says that instead of a dollar 80, they get a dollar 30. We call that the tax wedge. The tax wedge is the difference between the tax including the price and the tax after paying the price. So it's just a wedge between what what people get before they pay the tax and what they get after paying the tax. That's the tax wedge. We have a 50 cent tax wedge here. Okay? And so what is the burden of the tax on producers? Well, they used to get a dollar 50 a gallon. Now they get a dollar 80, but pay 50 cents to the government.

So the burden on the producers is 20 cents. Okay? So even though the producers are sending the check to the government, the gas stations, the gas companies sending the check to the government, they actually pay less than half the tax. Now, normally they pay the 50 cents, but we don't care about that. We just care about where they end up after the market has adjusted. After the market has adjusted, they are 20 cents per gallon worse off than they were before. And consumers are 30 cents per gallon worse off than they were before. This is the fundamental insight of tax incidence, that you can't just look at the paper version of who pays the tax.

You have to consider who really bears the consequences of the tax, and that's why it gets interesting. Because the party that bears the consequences is not necessarily the party that actually sends the check to the government. Okay? That's the fundamental insight of tax incidence. Questions about how that all works. Okay? So the bottom line is all you do is you say, "Look, think about how the tax affects the market." In this case, it's an upward shift in supply curve. Shift the supply curve up. Find the new equilibrium. That gives you the price That gives you the new equilibrium price. And then the burden on the party not paying the tax is the difference between the new price and the old price.

The burden on the p- party paying the tax uh is the new price minus the tax that, you know, minus the tax that you pay. Okay? Now, what's interesting about this is that within this framework, so the first bold claim I'm going to make is actually it doesn't matter who sends the check to the government. The first bold claim I'm let me say what The first bold claim I'm going to make is that the the amount sent on the check to the government is not the amount you actually bear of the tax. The amount you bear of the tax comes out of this analysis. Here's the second bold claim I'm going to make. It doesn't matter who sends the check to the government.

If you impose the same 50 cent tax on consumers of gas in the same market, you get the same outcome. How's that possible? Let's look at figure 22-2. Now we have a different tax. This tax is now every time you buy a gallon of gas, you pay 50 cents. Imagine the outcry. Imagine if the government had a tax which made gas companies pay 50 cents every gallon they sold and they said, "You know what? We're just going to switch that and make people pay the 50 cents." Could you imagine the headlines? The outcry? Government screwing the little guy to favor the oil companies. Okay? But in fact, those headlines would all be wrong.

Because in fact, it doesn't matter. To see why, let's look at the diagram 22-2. Now imagine we have 50 cent tax on consumers. Now the supply curve doesn't shift cuz marginal cost hasn't changed. But the demand curve shifts down. Because for every gallon you buy, you have to send 50 cents to the government. Well, the demand curve represents your willingness to pay. You are now willing to pay 50 cents less per gallon. If you're willing to pay before at point A, the 100 billionth gallon sold, they're willing to pay exactly a dollar 50. Well, if they only pay a dollar 50 and now I've sent 50 cents to the government, well now they're only willing to pay a dollar for that gas.

So what that means is consumers now, with the shift in demand curve, if the price stayed at a dollar 50, they would only want 80 billion gallons at point C. They would only want 80 billion gallons at a price of 150. Why? Because the price to them isn't 150 anymore. Okay, they now would they pay the 150 plus they pay the 20 cents they they'd have to pay another 50 cent check to the government. So they only want So the So to them uh they're they don't want 80 billion gallons. So if the new to a move move to a new equilibrium, once again we know about these adjustments, we talked about that, you're going to slide down the demand down the supply curve and you're going to end up at a new point D.

D is the new equilibrium with a new demand curve reflecting the much lower willingness to pay intersects the supply curve. That point, interestingly, is at 90 million 90 billion gallons. Flip the page back to 22-1, that's the same quantity we had before. So we get the same effect on the amount of gas sold. What's the difference is the market price. In 22-1, the market price rose to 180. Now the market price falls to 130. Okay? But the burdens are the same. Think about the burden on the consumer. The consumer used to pay a dollar fifty. Now they pay a dollar thirty. They've saved twenty cents. But they have to send a fifty cent check to the government.

So the burden on the consumer is thirty cents. They saved twenty cents on the price and sent a fifty cent check to the government. What's the burden on producers? Well, the producers used to get a dollar fifty. Now they get a dollar thirty. So what's the burden on producers? Twenty cents. Same as before. The point is for any given total tax wedge for any given total amount of tax who bears it does not depend on who sends the check into the government. That's irrelevant. The side of the market is irrelevant. All that matters is the underlying demand and supply curves and the size of the tax wedge.

As long as you have an underlying set of supply and demand curves and a given size tax wedge, you don't care who actually pays. Because the market will adjust to offset that. Okay? And so tax incidence, this is an incredible insight of tax incidence. Which is that something I'd imagine most of you walk in this room today and I quickly said to you, does it matter if the gas company pays fifty cents you pay fifty cents? You'd say, yeah, it matters. Okay? But it turns out it doesn't. Turns out it doesn't. As long as long given a given tax wedge given a set of supply and demand curves, it doesn't matter who actually pays.

Okay? And that's the fundamental ins- another fundamental insight of tax incidence. And that's why when you read articles in the paper about, you know, this tax is bad cuz it's on people, this tax is good cuz it's on corporations, that's not the way to think about it. The way to think about it is what's the total tax wedge and what does the market look like? Yeah. Ex- excellent point. All of this, of course, is within our standard 1401 framework. Once you depart from that, for By the way, it's also true even if there's monopoly and stuff, that's still true. So this does not depend on perfectly competitive markets.

This is also true in non- perfectly competitive markets. So monopoly, oligopoly will still feature these two rules. However, once you depart from perfectly rational consumers then things can change. So for example, there's a lot of interesting research on what's called tax salience. And as I said, since I won't have time for a lecture on behavioral economics this semester, I'm going to throw some behavioral economics nuggets at you, but if you find this interesting, take 1413, it's really exciting. And here's a kind of insight, which is what if people pay attention to taxes when it's in the price, but not when it's rung up at the register?

So they ran a cool experiment at supermarkets in California. They randomly in some cases increased the price on the shelf by the sales tax. In other cases, they kept the price fixed and the sales tax was rung up at the counter like we normally do. And they found that affected demand. That affected how much people wanted the good, even though the net price was the same. Because it was more salient when it was built into the price than when it's like at the end when you're just ringing it up, you don't pay attention to it. Yeah. Well, that's exactly what I said. That's exactly what There's There's two questions.

One is how does it affect the demand curve? That's what I was saying. That basically the demand curve I mean, it's not quite your question. Your question is about sort of a like a moral like do I feel differently if one's being taxed another? Are you Are you talking about the salience point? Yeah. I I I think I think we don't I I think we don't know for sure sort of the moral aspect, but the salience aspect we knew for do know for sure, which is how the tax is presented affects people's demand even though it shouldn't. Now there's another question, which I thought you were going to ask, which is how does the fact that you can see a tax affect people how people feel about taxes?

So here's a super cool study my colleague Amy Finkelstein did. You guys know about Easy Tag Easy Pass, the thing on the highway where you Okay. So when states moved it when I was a kid, you used to wait in line and pay cash to get through the tolls. Okay? Now you just drive through with your Easy Pass. So what's happened is it made the tax less salient. Right? It used to be you'd feel pain every time you go through the toll. Now it's just some bill you get at the end of the month. What she found is when states switched to Easy Pass, they rapidly raised their taxes on roads. They raised their tolls cuz people didn't mind as much.

So they could raise them more. So there's sort of an interesting politics aspect to this uh to this as well. So this matters. Having said that, I'm going to ignore it. But this stuff does matter and that's why behavioral economics is fascinating. Okay? Now there's a third point I want to make about taxes. So I talked about who bears taxes. I talked about the side of the market. Side of the market is irrelevant. And then the third point I want to make about taxes is it's all about the elasticities. Which is who bears the tax for a given tax wedge, who bears the tax is all determined by the elasticities supply and demand curve.

Okay? And in particular, inelastic parties get stuck with taxes while elastic parties avoid taxes. So inelastic agent inelastic firms inelastic consumers they get stuck with taxes while elastic elastically supplied firms elastically demanded goods, they avoid taxes. So to see that let's look at figure 22-3. Okay? Let's go back to our tax on the suppliers of gasoline. Once again, I hope you know by now it wouldn't matter if we did it on demanders of gasoline. But it's a little easier to see with suppliers of gasoline. Let's go back to our tax suppliers of gasoline. So we have a supply curve that's been shifted up by fifty cents.

Let's consider two markets, one with perfectly inelastic demand one with perfectly elastic demand. In the market with perfectly inelastic demand, we used to sell a hundred billion gallons at a price of 150. Now we levy a fifty cent tax on suppliers. Where do we end up? We end up still selling a hundred billion gallons of gas. You have to. Cuz it's inelastic. Well, if you're going to still sell a hundred fifty gallons of gas, then the suppliers can't bear any of the tax. They have to be able to fully pass the tax on to price. That is, they have to be able to charge two dollars. Think of the logic.

Suppliers have to be on their supply curve. The supply curve is just shifted up by fifty cents. Therefore, if you're going to sell the same quantity, the price must go up by fifty cents. So in that case, who bears the tax? Who bears this tax on gas? Don't raise your hand and tell me. Yeah. Consumers bear all of it. Right? Consumers bear all the tax, suppliers bear none. Supplier, you said, you're sending a fifty cent check to the government, but you're getting fifty cent higher price. So you don't care. Okay? Insert fifty cent joke here. In the gas? I don't know how you do a fifty cent joke, whatever.

Okay. So So you um So you So you don't care. Okay? Now let's flip the case. Let's imagine demand for um demand for gas is perfectly elastic. Okay? Now the supply curve is shifted up by fifty cents. Okay? Supply curve is shifted up by fifty cents. Now what happens is consumers say, look, I don't care how you feel, Mr. Supplier. I'm not paying more than a dollar fifty for gas. I have perfectly elastic demand. Supplier has no choice then but to eat the whole tax. Because if they try to pass any of it on to the consumer the consumer will bolt. So the new equilibrium is that the where the price stays the same of a dollar fifty and the quantity falls.

In this case, the producer bears the whole tax. The consumer pays no more than they did before. The gas company gets the same price they did before, but has to send a fifty cent check to the government. So the entire burden is borne by the producer. What is going on? Why do Why with inelastic demand What's the intuition here? For I with inelastic demand, consumers then end up getting stuck with the tax. And with elastic demand, consumers avoid it. Yeah. Right. Exactly. I like to think of this a very good explanation. I like to think of this in terms of almost like negotiating power. It's not the right way to think about it, but it's a useful intuition.

That when you've got inelastic demand, you've got no no negotiating power. You just want insulin. You're going to pay anything for insulin. So, the supplier knows that, so he's going to make you pay the whole tax. It doesn't matter if you send the check to the government, he sends the check to the government, he's going to pass the whole cost to you. But, if you think about fast food, if you think about a tax on hamburgers, if you charge a penny more for hamburgers, I'm going to buy a hot dog or a slice of pizza, then the supplier knows they're screwed. They have no leverage. You have all the leverage.

You have all the negotiating power. So, they can't raise the price on you. So, the bottom line is inelastic factors get stuck with taxes, and elastic factors avoid taxes. Okay? And that's sort of the other lesson we get here as we think about about about taxation. Okay? So, at the end of the day, all that matters, if you think about any tax being imposed in the US, it's never as simple as just a gas tax, often a complicated giant set of taxes. If you think about simple a single tax, all you need to know is the elasticity of supply and demand and the size of the tax and you're done. You can figure out who bears the tax.

Okay? And the Congressional Budget Office, for example, does these exercises all the time and has estimates of how given tax changes will affect the income distribution as a result. Okay? Now, um And actually there's a pretty cool study of this. Let me ask the question. We we have hospital taxes. We have hospital We have hotel taxes. I'm too got too much health care on the brain. We've got We've got hotel taxes in many major cities. Okay? There's some instance of a hotel tax. You can imagine diagram you've got supply demand. How does the incidence of the hotel tax change when Airbnb comes in? Yeah.

Um the consumer is suddenly much much much more able to switch around. And so, a lot more of the tax will be all of it borne by the consumer. Exactly. What you see, and how would you test that? How would you test that? Yeah. Compare prices in areas with different taxation rates. Exactly. What you find is when Airbnb comes in, hotel prices have hotel taxes are passed less on to price. Hotel owners are more bearing the taxes compared to consumers cuz consumers are more elastic. So, that's sort of an example of how this can matter. Okay. So, now let me say one other one other thing about taxes. The last thing I want to say about taxes is uh what to tax.

And this is a fundamental debate that goes back to the 17th century, which is essentially should we tax people based on what they produce, that is their income, or should we tax people based on what they consume, their consumption? Okay, the philosopher Thomas Hobbes and like 17 whatever, talked about why should we tax people based on the fruits of their labor? Let's tax them based on what they take out of society, that is what they consume. And this is a debate economists have had for centuries. Should we tax consumption or income? This is a debate which shows in the real world because in Europe, they rely much more on consumption taxes than we do.

Yeah. Why would it matter? Uh I'm going to tell you why it matters. So, Europe, they rely much more on consumption taxes than we do. So, in the US, most of our taxes come from income taxes. In Europe, a lot of their tax revenue comes from what's called the value added tax. Any of you who've traveled in Europe will know about the value added tax, which is a form of consumption taxation. So, this is a debate that plays out internationally. In the US, we have sales taxes, but they're quite small as a share of revenues compared to European nations. Now, why do we care? Well, we care because of the following equation.

Why, your income, can either be spent on stuff or saved. Your can either be spent on stuff or saved. Okay? And we And as I talked about a few lectures ago, savings is a major engine of growth in the economy. More savings means a broader pool of capital, means a broader pool of capital, which means a lower interest rate, which means firms can invest more. So, we like promoting savings in the long run. In the short run, a recession may feel differently, but in the long run, we like having more savings. So, over the long run, we like having more savings. If you tax income, you tax both my consumption and my savings.

If you tax my consumption, then you don't tax my savings. That is, you relatively favor savings over consumption. You promote people to save rather than consuming. Okay? So, that's why many economists, I think probably if you did a poll of economists and said should we tax income or consumption, the majority would say consumption. And the reason they would give is because we need to we need more savings in society and we need to promote that. Yeah. Would it be equivalent to taxing income and then giving a tax break for saving? That would be identically equivalent. If you gave a 100% tax credit for all of your savings, that'd be identical.

Now, in the US, we have some partial credits like that, but far from 100%. Okay? So, the question is what's the counterargument? Well, the counterargument is all about fairness, which is that it turns out that the rich save and nobody else does. Basically, almost all the savings in society is done by the top probably 10% of individuals in society. And the bottom 50% of individuals in society have basically no savings. So, essentially, what this means is for most Americans, for the typical American, this debate is irrelevant cuz they have no savings. If they tax their income or tax their consumption, it's the same thing.

For rich Americans, it'd be a much better deal to tax consumption because they have savings that then wouldn't be taxed. So, the problem with the consumption tax base would be a mean a massive redistribution from the poor to the rich because the rich folks do the savings. Now, there would be a simple answer to There would be an answer to this. We could answer this cuz ultimately, right, the rich folks die. It doesn't matter how rich they are, they die eventually. Okay? And if at that point we taxed all their savings, we could then equalize things. So, in other words, if we took all the money that was left, let's say we had this consumption tax, but we counted as consumption the money you left behind when you died.

Then it would solve the problem cuz the rich would have During their life, they'd pay less tax, but they'd pay it all at the end. But, the prob So, but that So, that's why such we have such a critical debate in this country over the estate tax or the so-called death tax. Okay? This notion of sort of whether you should be taxed on their estates becomes very important for thinking about this. If we had an estate tax that was really the same way as all the taxes, then we could move to taxing consumption it it would be the same. In fact, we'd essentially have a consumption tax at that point. Okay?

But, in fact, we have an estate tax that is paid by the top It's paid only by the top 0.04% of people who die each year. Um and it's paid on only a fraction of their assets. So, we don't have that. So, that's why the fairness sort of debate comes in. Okay? So, I just want to point out just another These are all just sort of topics I'm hitting to sort of wet your appetite. These are sort of interesting things we need to think about when we think about how to set up our tax systems. Is basically uh things like do we tax income or consumption? Okay? Questions about that? Okay. That's taxes. Now, I want to turn to So, that's one side of the equation, which is taxes.

We know they cause inefficiencies, we know they cause deadweight losses. Okay? We know there's some and we know that there's some question about who bears them. But, the bottom line is taxes are putting some leak in the bucket and that's a problem. The other side of the leak in the bucket is transfers, which is, as we saw in the diagram last time, if you tax if you essentially condition my getting money on my working, I'll work less. If you say to me, "Hey, John, if you you're currently making $5,000 a year, I'm going to give you $10,000 no matter what you do, but any money you earn will come off that $10,000." I'll say, "Great, I'll just quit." Okay?

So, the problem with transfers is they are they act like taxes. Okay? If you take the transfers and phase them out, take them away from people, they have a similar effect. We in fact we call transfers an implicit tax. So, I thought about our transfer system from last time, which is the amount you got was the max of zero was the max of zero or 10,000 minus your income. This is essentially a 100% tax rate on everybody's incomes below $10,000. Right? Because for every dollar you earn, we take it away cuz you get 10,000 no matter what. So, this is a tax, basically. But, in fact, this tax is unavoidable if we want to target money to poor people.

If we just gave everyone $10,000, it wouldn't be a tax. Okay? We just gave everyone $10,000. Now, it would impact how hard people work. Why? Why would it impact how hard people work? Yeah. You got bottom of the 60 minutes. No, no, I'm going to like labor supply theory. What's the name of the effect for why that would affect how hard people work if you gave them $10,000? The income effect. So, it would affect how hard people work, but it wouldn't really distort people's labors. We we think of distortions arise from the substitution effect. People making different decisions because of tax rates.

The reason we get a problem, the reason we get deadweight loss, is because I've take I'm not that I'm giving $10,000 that I'm taking away as you get richer. Okay? That's the problem. So, then the question is what can we do about this? What can we do about the fact that we're essentially imposing implicit taxes on poor people by giving them money? So, there are a couple answers. The first is categorical transfers. That is, instead of giving the money to everybody, just give it to deserving populations. Okay? So, for example, one of the the largest single cash transfer program, pure cash transfer program in the US, um is to uh that that's literally giving cash is what's called the SSI program, the supplemental security income program.

It's about $80 billion a year. And what this does is give cash grants to low-income families that have disabled children. So, it's not just that you're low-income, but that you have a disabled child in your house. Okay? Likewise, we have something called the TANF program, which is what is traditionally called you know I've used the term welfare in this course to mean well-being. Traditionally in America when you say welfare with sort of a sneer on your face, you're referring to TANF. Okay? TANF is cash grants to low-income single family single-parent households. Essentially, if you're low-income and you're single mom typically, uh you get uh a grant from the government.

Now, the question we've always asked is, why do we impose these conditions? Why do we make people disabled? Why do we make them be single moms? Why don't just give them the money? Why not have this? Why have these other conditions? And the answer is because that basically we think this is a way of reducing the distortion that arises from transfers. Think of it this way. Imagine all of us were born with on our forehead an unremovable tattoo that said hard-working and lazy. No, let's not do that. Different thing. Let's do low low low skill and high skill. Okay? And that So, I know your underlying ability.

Then I would simply say, "Look, if you're high skill, you don't get any money. I don't care if you're poor. If you're poor, it just means you're lazy. Cuz I know you're high skill. If you're low skill, I'm going to give you money." And that would not distort behavior at all. Cuz people couldn't change what's on their head. So, they would just continue to work as hard as they always worked. This is the idea of trying to find signals like that. You're trying to find ways of identifying the people who need the help. And by doing so, who need the help, but need the help in a way that's not changeable by their behavior.

Okay? We think that a kid being disabled, they didn't choose to be disabled. Or mom being single mom, she didn't choose to be single mom. That starts to get a little more interesting. Okay? So, essentially the idea of categorical welfare is to basically say, can we find things about people that they didn't choose on which we can base giving them money? Okay? So, blindness is a good example, et cetera. Okay? Now, the question that then raises well can people choose these things? Well, you might say, "Well, of course a kid can't choose to be disabled, but mom people can choose to be single moms." Okay?

In fact, the evidence is the opposite. Let me explain what I mean. If you give people money tied to being a single mom, it doesn't cause them to be a single mom. The evidence is very clear on that. So, there's there've been hundreds of studies showing that paying women money conditional on being a single mom doesn't cause them to get divorced or have kids out of wedlock. That's been clear. But, if you give family money based on kids being disabled, more disabled kids show up. Why? Cuz disability is a tough thing to assess. Most disabilities are musculoskeletal or mental. And those are hard things.

You can tell if a kid's missing a limb, but it's hard to evaluate truly musculoskeletal or mental disabilities. And interestingly, despite your intuition what it might have been a few minutes ago, the place where in substance we see the most people change their behavior to qualify, at least change their behavior meaning not becoming disabled, but claiming they're disabled, uh is here and not in single motherhood. So, categorical transfers help, but not as much as you might think because the categories are hard to measure. Okay? And that's why another tool we've used to try to get at this is in-kind transfers.

In-kind transfers. Okay? Part of the problem, yeah, Manny. So, the TANF, does it account like when it says like for single parents, does it account for like people that live in the household? So, like if It's a great question. That's that's a tricky thing they have to deal with. Which is kind of you know uh which is sort of how do you deal with co-residing people? And that's something they have a complicated set of rules about. You have a problem with like the stuff you can't choose thing because like you seem to like try to simplify the cause of someone's poverty without simplifying the cause.

Right. Whereas like I think in real life it's probably related to like the circumstances of your birth. Absolutely. Other stuff like that. And so, is it possible that these indicators are making it worse for people who are in situations where they couldn't have avoided being in poverty, but they happen to not be a single mom or not be disabled? Awesome question. And so, basically, here's the tradeoff. Okay? Give me a better way to teach it. Here's the tradeoff. The tradeoff is the more you target, let's say I said I'm going to replace our entire welfare system in America with just transfers to the blind.

And let's assume people don't blind themselves to get money. Okay? You laugh, but there is a city in Florida uh where um where uh they found that over certain period of time, the vast majority of US claims for lost limbs came from one city in Florida. And it turned out that people were actually cutting off their limbs to qualify for government money. They actually called it Numb City. So, uh you laugh, this stuff does happen, but by and large we assume it doesn't. Okay? So, let's say I want to replace the entire US welfare system with uh with one just people who are blind. On the one hand, that would be great because you wouldn't cause any distortion.

People wouldn't worry work any less hard cuz you can't change whether you're blind. On the other hand, you leave all these people out in the cold who need help. So, that's the tradeoff, which is the broader you spread it, the more you move towards sort of a universal system, the more potential distortion you cause in terms of people changing their work behavior, um but the broader set of people you can help. And that's why there's a big move now for what's called universal basic income, UBI. It's a big movement now around the world to say, "Look, forget these things. SSI, TANF, they're all messy to measure, they're um stigmatizing, people can change them anyway.

Let's just give people money." And that's sort of that's sort of one motivation for that. Now, but the other way to get at this that people come at is, "Look, the problem all here is a simple one, which is everyone loves money. Rich or poor, we all love money. But what if what we gave people was not money, but things that poor people need and rich people don't? Like, for example, mediocre public housing. Not a mansion, but an apartment. A rich person isn't going to pretend they're poor to get a crappy apartment or a mediocre apartment. But a poor person who'd be homeless otherwise will happily take it.

What about medical care? Rich people have private health insurance. They don't need government medical care. Poor people need government medical care. What about food stamps? Okay, rich people can't afford food. Poor uh uh poor people can. So, the idea is basically by giving in-kind transfers like medical care or housing or food, we get people to to what we call self- reveal that they're poor. Here the problem is people might pretend they're poor to get the money. They might quit. Even if they're not even if they can afford to work, they might quit. Here we say, "Well, look, you're not going to quit your job to get a mediocre You you guys with your you know making 100 grand a year at MIT are going to quit your jobs to get some mediocre public sector apartment." Okay?

But if I said I'll give you 100 grand whether you work or not, you might quit your job. But they're giving you a mediocre apartment, you won't. So, the idea by giving people in-kind benefits to get them to self-reveal whether they're actually um whether they're actually uh poor or not. Now, that's not the main reason why I give in-kind transfers. This is the economist reason. The main reason is cuz because politicians are what we call paternalistic. And this comes all the way back. You guys remember when we discussed food stamps and we did budget constraints and I said, "Well, we never going to give people food stamps.

We want to give them money." And I said, "But what if the Y axis was labeled cocaine?" Then we would want to give them food stamps because you don't want them to spend their money on cocaine. Well, that's how politicians feel about poor people. They feel that poor people, if you give them money, will just waste it. And that's why the vast majority of transfers we do in America are in-kind. If you add up all the money we give people in cash versus the money we give in-kind, particularly medical care, the in-kind dollars vastly outweigh the cash dollars. And that's because politicians are paternalistic.

They're afraid Now, that I mean the economics reason is cuz there's all this model of self-revelation, but that's not why why politicians do it. They do it because they're worried people will waste the money if you give them cash. And I think we showed with the food stamps and the evidence that's not really the right way to think about it. Okay? Questions about that? Okay. Now, this is all kind of negative and nebulous. So, let me sort of conclude with a great example. Which example of a public policy which actually doesn't stop the leak in the bucket, actually puts a patch in the bucket. And that policy is called the earned income tax credit.

The EITC. Okay? This is what's known conditional transfer. What that means is it's a program where you get money, but the money you get is a function of how much you make. Up to a point. So, it's actually the other way the other thing the EITC would call this is a wage subsidy. So, here's how the EITC works. Let's go to figure 22-4. I'll show you how the EITC works. Here's how EITC works. For every dollar on the x-axis is how much earned income you have. On the y-axis is the check you're going to get from the government. What this says is on every dollar you earn until you earn 13,870. These numbers are a bit out of date, it's a little more now, but roughly gives you the idea.

Until you earn 13,870, that is think of this roughly the poverty line, right? It's a little bit more than the poverty line. For every dollar you earn the government gives you 40 cents more. So, if you earn a if you're someone who starts with zero and you earn a dollar, you take home a dollar 40. It's a negative tax. It's a subsidy. So, every dollar you earn you take home a dollar 40 until you reach earnings of 13,870. At that point you've achieved a check of $5,548. That's 40% of 13,870. At that point the government says this is the biggest check we're sending you. And we're going to keep that flat until you're at 18,110.

And then we're going to start to take it away. We start to take it away so that by the time and what we're going to do is we're going to take that 5548 check down by 21 cents for every dollar earned. It's going to flip from a negative tax to a positive tax at a 21% rate. So, instead of a negative tax at a 40% rate we switch to a positive tax at a 21% rate. So, that by the time you've earned 44,454, okay? You have uh you've zeroed out your EITC. So, for most of you the EITC will be irrelevant. Okay, for most of your families the EITC is irrelevant. So, it's a targeted transfer program. Conditional transfer, it's conditional because basically it's conditional on working.

But it's targeted in the sense that it phases out such that middle class and upper class people don't get it. It's targeted to lower income people through this phase out. The problem is this makes the EITC effect complicated. So, let's consider Let's consider the three segments of this graph. Let's start with the first segment. Let's say you were earning zero and I said for every dollar you earn I will give you 40 cents more. Okay? What effect does that have on your labor supply? Starting from zero. Yeah. You work more because the substitution effect will make you work more because if you're just having a lot of leisure it's going to cost you a lot more.

Is it substitution effect to make you work more because essentially we've raised the price of leisure by 40%? What about the income effect? There is no income effect. So, the point is for someone at zero this unambiguously increased their labor supply. So, if you take guys who aren't working, this definitely will I mean it might be a zero effect, but it's non-negative effect on labor supply. Likewise with low income working low hours, the income effect will be small. I mean income effect is proportional to how much you're actually earning. So, for these people at on the left-hand segment upward sloping, it should cause them to work more because the substitution effect will be big and the income effect will be small.

So, if you mark the people on sort of this left-hand segment, you should mark they'll work more. Now, what about people on the flat segment? Someone someone else raise their hand and tell me. What's this going to do to labor supply of people on the flat segment? They're going to work more or less? Yeah. I I think they'd work the same cuz there's not like any change in their earnings. Well, there's no their wage hasn't changed, but something has changed. Um the third and last part they'll work less because they only have to work until they make 13,870 to get 18,110. In other word Well, that's not quite that's an extreme model.

More generally it's cuz of income effects. More generally the point is I've taken someone and made them $5,000 richer. So, compared to a world without the EITC, that's I should have compared to a world without the EITC, I will now work less. There's no substitution effect, only income effect. So, now I'll work less. So, the first part is income and substitution effects. The second part is just an income effect. Now, what about the third segment? Well, assuming leisure is normal, do I work more or less? They work more or less assuming assuming leisure is assuming leisure is normal. Yeah. Less. Less because?

Um the substitution effect. Substitution effect and income effect because your income is falling as because as you because the point is as you work more your income is falling. So, here both the substitution and income effect combine to make you want to work less. So, if you look at this graph, this doesn't look very promising. On the left we've got a bunch of guys working more. In the middle we got guys working less and the other side we got many guys working way less cuz you have a substitution and income effect. Okay? So, the question then is what effect does the EITC have? And the answer is it turns out has an enormously positive effect on labor supply.

That it gets a lot of guys who were working zero to stop working zero. But it doesn't seem to lower the hours among those who working more than zero hours. Now, why is that? Unclear. It could be because there's different elasticities along the income distribution. Probably it's cuz probably it's because of tax salience. Whoever I wrote that. Wherever the hell I wrote that. Tax salience. Which is that people understand gee, if I go to work I get a big check. They don't understand by the way the marginal hour I work is being taxed at 21 cents more. So, probably it's tax salience, I don't know, but the bottom line is the studies show convincingly that interest in the EITC massively increase labor supply and distribute to the poorest people in society.

This is a reverse leaky bucket. Literally we managed to take money, give it to poor people and make the pie bigger. So, this is an enormous victory for thinking about how we can for getting around this problem of how we can transfer to people. Now, it doesn't solve all our problems because Kevin could have commented up here, it doesn't help people who don't work. So, there's still this isn't the only solution we need cuz some people literally can't work. So, they can't benefit from a program like this. But for workers, this is an enormously successful program that is really one of the great sort of government success stories in terms of both transferring to poor people and increasing the size of the pie.

All right? I'm going to stop there. Um and so we'll come back uh we'll come I'll see you guys on Wednesday.